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Abstract  As it emerged from philosophical analyses and cognitive research, most 
concepts exhibit  typicality effects,  and resist  to the efforts of defining them in 
terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. This holds also in the case of many 
medical concepts. This is a problem for the design of computer science ontologies, 
since knowledge representation formalisms commonly adopted in this field (such 
as, in the first place, the Web Ontology Language – OWL) do not allow for the 
representation of concepts in terms of typical traits. However, the need of repre-
senting concepts in terms of typical traits concerns almost every domain of real 
world knowledge, including medical domains. In particular, in this article we take 
into account the domain of mental disorders, starting from the DSM-5 descriptions 
of some specific mental disorders. On this respect, we favor a hybrid approach to 
the representation of psychiatric concepts, in which ontology oriented formalisms 
are combined to a geometric representation of knowledge based on conceptual 
spaces. 
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0. Introduction
As it emerged from philosophical analyses and cognitive research, 
most concepts exhibit typicality effects, and resist to the efforts of 
defining them in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. This 
holds also in the case of many medical concepts. This is a problem 
for the design of computer science ontologies, since knowledge rep-
resentation formalisms commonly adopted in this field (such as, in 
the first place, the Web Ontology Language – OWL) do not allow 
for the representation of concepts in terms of typical traits. However, 
the need of representing concepts in terms of typical traits concerns 
almost every domain of real  world knowledge,  including medical 
domains. In this article we take into account the domain of mental 
disorders,  starting  from the  DSM-5 descriptions  of  some specific 
mental disorders. On this respect, we favor a hybrid approach to the 
representation of psychiatric concepts, in which ontology oriented 
formalisms are combined to a geometric representation of knowl-
edge based on conceptual spaces. 
In Section 1. we shall expose some problems faced by the classical 
theory  of  concepts,  according  to  which  concepts  can  be  defined 
through necessary and sufficient conditions. In particular, we shall 
examine  the  important  issues  raised  by  conceptual  “typicality”, 
which concerns both common-sense and medical concepts, focusing 
on the general concept of MENTAL DISORDER and the various 
concepts of individual mental disorders as described by DSM-5. In 
Section 2. we shall briefly summarize the most common way to deal 
with the problem of concept representation, which received a great 
deal of attention within the field of artificial intelligence (AI), due to 
its relevance for semantic technologies and for the development of 
formal  ontologies.  We shall  maintain that  the most  representative 
formalisms currently adopted for the development of formal ontolo-
gies, known as description logics (DLs), are unfortunately unable to 
represent concepts in prototypical terms. In Section 3. we shall de-
scribe  an  ontology  we  specifically  build  to  represent  the  general 
concept of MENTAL DISORDER and (most of) the various con-
cepts of individual mental disorders. Despite the fact that there al-
ready are formal ontologies dealing with mental disorders, we de-
cided to develop a new one trying to overcome some of their poten-
tial limitations. As our formal ontology, despite being more DSM-5 
compliant than others, is still unable to handle typicality effects, in 
Section 4. we shall propose a hybrid approach combining a “classi-
cal” component (in which concepts are represented in terms of nec-
essary and/or sufficient conditions) with a “typicality-oriented” com-
ponent,  allowing  both  prototype  and  exemplar-based  representa-
tions. 
1. Representing Concepts: Some Problems Raised by Medicine
In philosophy and cognitive sciences,  different  theories  about  the 
nature of concepts have been proposed. According to the traditional 
view, known as “classical”, concepts can be simply defined in terms 
of sets of necessary and sufficient conditions. This theory was domi-
nant since the times of Aristotle until the mid’70s of the last century, 
when the philosophical analyses by Ludwig Wittgenstein (Wittgen-
stein 1953) and the experimental results obtained by Eleaonor Rosch 
(Rosch 1975; Rosch and Mervis 1975) showed that, for most of the 
common-sense concepts, this position does not hold since conceptu-
al structures are mainly characterized by “typical” category member-
ship cues and thus suggested that are organized in human mind in 
terms of prototypes. Since then, different positions and theories on 
the nature of concepts have been proposed in order to explain the 
aspects  concerning  conceptual  “typicality”.  Usually,  they  are 
grouped in three main classes, namely: prototype views, exemplar 
views and theory-theories (see e.g. Murphy 2002; Machery 2009). 
All of them are assumed to account for (some aspects of) prototypi-
cal effects in conceptualization. 
According to the prototype view (introduced by Rosch), knowledge 
about  categories  is  stored in terms of  prototypes,  i.e.  in  terms of 
some representation of the “best” instances of the category. For ex-
ample, the concept CAT should coincide with a representation of a 
prototypical cat. In the simpler versions of this approach, prototypes 
are represented as (possibly weighted) lists of features. 
According to the exemplar view, a given category is mentally repre-
sented as a set of specific exemplars explicitly stored within memo-
ry: the mental representation of the concept CAT is the set of the 
representations of (some of) the cats we encountered during our life-
time. 
Theory-theory approaches adopt some form of holistic point of view 
about concepts. According to some versions of the theory-theories, 
concepts are analogous to theoretical terms in a scientific theory. For 
example, the concept CAT is individuated by the role it plays in our 
mental theory of zoology. In other version of the approach, concepts 
themselves are identified with micro-theories of some sort. For ex-
ample, the concept CAT should be identified with a mentally repre-
sented micro-theory about cats. 
These approaches turned out to be not mutually exclusive. Rather, 
they seem to  succeed in  explaining different  classes  of  cognitive 
phenomena, and many researchers hold that all of them are needed 
to  explain  psychological  data  (see  again  Murphy  2002;  Machery 
2009).
The case of some medical concepts, such as the general concept of 
DISEASE  and  the  various  individual  disease  concepts  (such  as 
PNEUMONIA,  BREAST  CANCER,  SCHIZOPHRENIA,  BOR-
DERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER, and so on) show the same 
“problems” presented by most common-sense concepts, as they can 
hardly be represented in terms of individually necessary and jointly 
sufficient conditions. Faced with the issues raised by the many at-
tempts  to  find  a  traditional  definition  for  the  general  concept  of 
DISEASE (Amoretti  2015),  some philosophers  of  medicine  have 
thus proposed to regard the concept of DISEASE and those of indi-
vidual diseases as non-classical ones. In this vein, on the grounds of 
the great variability among individual diseases, new theories based 
on  family  resemblances,  prototypes  or  exemplars  have  been  pro-
posed  (see  e.g.  Sadegh-Zadeh  2011,  2000,  2008,  Lilienfeld  and 
Marino 1995, 1999, Pickering 2013, 2016, McNally 2011). 
In the case of family resemblances, there is no common feature that 
all individual diseases must have, but any two of them should share 
at least one feature. In the case of prototypes, there is a set of proper-
ties that represents the best instance of the disease category, that is 
an ideal and abstract construction of the general concept of disease, 
the prototype, to which any individual disease must approximate to 
some degree, sharing with it a goodly number of properties. In the 
case of exemplars, some individual diseases are regarded as particu-
larly relevant, as the exemplars of the disease category, and thus all 
other diseases must exhibit a goodly number of their specific fea-
tures.
These views are obviously different: embracing the family resem-
blances theory implies that there is no specific set of properties, de-
termined by the prototype or the exemplars, that individual diseases 
must meet to some degree; the prototype is an abstract construction 
that doesn’t need to correspond to any individual disease, while the 
exemplars are concrete members of the category. Nevertheless they 
are often conflated or muddled in the relevant literature. 
For example, McNally (2011, p. 212) refers to Wittgenstein saying 
that “Examples of most useful concepts bear only a family resem-
blance to one another. Most have some overlapping attributes with-
out sharing an essence present in every case”; but clearly he has in 
mind the prototype view, as he continues specifying that “The more 
attributes  a  given  case  has,  the  better  an  example  it  is  of  the 
concept”. A similar confusion is made by Cooper (2007, p. 41), who 
mentions family resemblances saying that “While there need not be 
any one feature that all family members possess, any two members 
will be similar in a variety of ways”; however, she unpacks this idea 
through the exemplar view: “whether a condition counts as a mental 
disorder depends on its degree of resemblance to prototypical cases, 
such as schizophrenia and psychotic depression. Conditions that are 
sufficiently like these central cases get counted as disorders”. Again, 
Sadegh-Zadeh (2008, p. 119) seems to conflates prototypes and ex-
emplars claiming that “A concept determines a category […] by ex-
hibiting the relational structure of the category that is characterized 
by best examples, called prototypes, such that other category resem-
ble them to different extents”.
The above confusions can be partially explained by the fact that all 
three  views  offer  a  plausible  way  to  deal  with  conceptual 
“typicality”, that is the evidence that some instances of the general 
category of disease, namely some individual diseases, are regarded 
as more representative than others. Moreover, all three views agree 
that there is no set of properties shared by all and only individual 
diseases: no specific property is individually necessary and no fixed 
number of them is sufficient to characterize the general concept of 
DISEASE. On the contrary, overall similarities among different set 
of properties should encompass the absence of any particular shared 
property – such as, as it is often claimed, dysfunction (Boorse 1976, 
Wakefield 1992, 1999). 
Many scholars adopting one of the above strategies do not attempt to 
better  explicate the similarities relationship among individual  dis-
eases (Lilienfeld and Marino 1995, 1999); others think that fuzzy 
logic is the best, and possibly the only, way do the job (Seising and 
Tabacchi 2013, Sadegh-Zadeh 2000, 2008, 2011) – but, of course, 
some important alternatives to represent non-classical concepts have 
been proposed in the general  literature,  especially because fuzzy-
logic faces some unavoidable difficulties in handling typicality (on 
this aspect see Frixione and Lieto 2014a).  
As sketched above, approaches based on family resemblances, pro-
totypes, and exemplars have been used to characterize the general 
concept of DISEASE, but they seem particularly suited to handle the 
general  concept of MENTAL DISORDER (Lilienfeld and Marino 
1995,  1999) as well  as the various concepts of  individual  mental 
disorders. This more restricted class of medical concepts will be the 
focus of our present work.
The  DSM  (the  Diagnostic  and  Statistic  Manual  of  Mental 
Disorders), which is published by the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion and represents a sort  of  “bible” for psychiatrists  and scholars 
within the field of mental pathology, has in fact a merely descriptive 
approach: it rarely incorporates theoretical information regarding the 
causes of individual mental disorders, and classifies them using a list 
of operational diagnostic criteria. As a consequence, and somehow 
differently to what usually happens with individual somatic diseases 
included in ICD (the International Classification of Disease), indi-
vidual mental disorders are typically identified not by their etiology 
or underlying pathological cause (a few exceptions being, for exam-
ple,  the  different  types  of  neurocognitive  disorders),  but  through 
their syndromes, that is through a catalogue of their characterizing 
symptoms and signs; in most cases none of them is individually nec-
essary and no fixed number of them is sufficient to determine mem-
bership to a certain individual disorder category. Moreover, in most 
cases these syndromes are not supposed to be reified, as to corre-
spond to some kind of entity or mechanism (such as an underlying 
dysfunction). 
Let’s see, for instance, an oversimplified version of the diagnostic 
criteria for schizophrenia and borderline personality disorder given 
by the DSM-5. Criterion A for schizophrenia states: 
A. Two (or more) of the following, each present for a significant portion of time during a 
1-month period (or less if successfully treated). At least one of these must be (1), (2), or 
(3): 
1. Delusions. 
2. Hallucinations. 
3. Disorganized speech (e.g., frequent derailment or incoherence). 
4. Grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior. 
5. Negative symptoms (i.e., diminished emotional expression or avolition) (American 
Psychiatric Association 2013, p. 99, our italics).
Similarly, but even more explicatory, borderline personality disorder 
is characterized as follows:
A pervasive pattern of instability of interpersonal relationships, self-image, and affects, 
and marked impulsivity, beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts, 
as indicated by five (or more) of the following: 
1. Frantic efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment. […] 
2. A pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal relationships characterized by 
alternating between extremes of idealization and devaluation. 
3. Identity disturbance: markedly and persistently unstable self-image or sense of self. 
4. Impulsivity in at least two areas that are potentially self-damaging (e.g., spending, sex,  
substance abuse, reckless driving, binge eating). […]
5. Recurrent suicidal behavior, gestures, or threats, or self-mutilating behavior. 
6. Affective instability due to a marked reactivity of mood (e.g., intense episodic 
dysphoria, irritability, or anxiety usually lasting a few hours and only rarely more than a 
few days). 
7. Chronic feelings of emptiness. 
8. Inappropriate, intense anger or difficulty controlling anger (e.g., frequent displays of 
temper, constant anger, recurrent physical fights). 
9. Transient, stress-related paranoid ideation or severe dissociative symptoms (American 
Psychiatric Association 2013, p. 663, our italics). 
It is easy to see that there are many different ways to meet the re-
quirements of schizophrenia or bipolar personality disorders stated 
above, and it is of course possible that members of these categories 
have no characteristics in common. For example, Galatzer-Levy and 
Bryant  (2013)  recently  calculated  that  there  are  636,120 ways  to 
meet the requirements of the concept of post-traumatic stress disor-
der.
The operational criteria, introduced in DSM-III (1982), were meant 
to replace what psychiatrists dub as “prototypes”,  that is short de-
scriptions of  paradigmatic  cases that  would serve as  standards of 
comparison to evaluate and diagnose any single patient. Here, as an 
example, the category of schizophrenic reactions according to DSM-
I (1952): 
It represents a group of psychotic reactions characterized by fundamental disturbances in 
reality relationships and concept formations, with affective, behavioral, and intellectual 
disturbances in varying degrees and mixtures. The disorders are marked by strong 
tendency to retreat from reality, by emotional disharmony, unpredictable disturbances in 
stream of thought, regressive behavior, and in some, by a tendency to deterioration, 
(American Psychiatric Association 1952, p. 26). 
Even if the operational structure of DSM-5 coincides neither with 
the prototype nor the exemplar views as they are developed by cog-
nitive psychologists, it may still suggest to incorporate some features 
of these approaches in the representations of the various concepts of 
individual  mental  disorders  (such  as,  SCHIZOPHRENIA,  BOR-
DERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER, MAJOR DEPRESSION, 
etc.)  as well as the general concept of MENTAL DISORDER, as 
like non-classical concepts they cannot be possibly defined through 
necessary and sufficient conditions, and clearly exhibit prototypical 
effects. 
In order to address this problem from a computational perspective, 
we have analyzed the field of logic-oriented knowledge representa-
tion systems and, in particular,  the class of formalisms known as 
formal ontologies. We provide below a brief overview of this class 
of systems by showing that, also in this artificial context, we face the 
problem  of  representing  typical  or  “non-classical” information  of 
medical concepts. 
2. Formal Ontologies and Common-Sense Representations
In the last decades the problem of concept representation received a 
great deal of attention within the field of artificial intelligence (AI), 
and in particular in knowledge representation, due to its relevance 
for semantic technologies and for the development of formal ontolo-
gies. 
In the AI tradition, an ontology is “an engineering artifact, constitut-
ed by a specific vocabulary used to describe a certain reality, plus a 
set of explicit (axiomatic) assumptions regarding the intended mean-
ing  of  the  vocabulary  words” (Guarino  1998).  The  representation 
languages  adopted  for  the  development  of  formal  ontologies 
stemmed from the tradition of so-called structured inheritance se-
mantic networks – the first system in this line of research was KL-
ONE (Brachman and Schmolze 1985). These formalisms are known 
today as description logics (DLs), and the main formal ontological 
languages such as OWL and OWL 2 belong to this class. The main 
constructs  of  such  languages  are  concepts  (or  classes),  roles  (or 
properties), and individuals. 
DLs are logical systems (usually, they are subsets of first order pred-
icate calculus).  They can perform a series of important automatic 
inferences, such as categorization (the process of attributing a spe-
cific individual as a member to a class), classification (the process 
through which new class-subclass relations are inferred) and consis-
tency checking (the process of testing the logical coherence of a giv-
en ontology). 
As logical systems, DLs have a model theoretic, Tarskian style se-
mantics  associated to them (Horrocks et  al.  2003).  This  fact  is  a 
symptom of a problem: Tarskian semantics is fully compositional, 
and typicality effects are hard to accommodate with compositionali-
ty  (Fodor  1981).  Indeed,  DLs do not  allow the  representation  of 
concepts in prototypical terms (on this aspect see Frixione and Lieto, 
2012). DLs allow the representation of concepts exclusively in terms 
of  sets  of  necessary and/or  sufficient  conditions.  This  is  a  severe 
drawback from the standpoint of the representation of many classes 
of concepts. 
In particular, this strong bias towards the representation of concepts 
in  terms of  necessary and/or  sufficient  conditions  alone is  also  a 
problem in the field of medical ontologies. Most of them, indeed, 
(including  SNOMED,  the  largest  biomedical  ontology  currently 
available: http://www.ihtsdo.org/snomed-ct) are conditioned by the 
adoption of formalisms that do not allow to represent concepts in 
typical terms. 
This  possibility  should  be  of  crucial  importance  for  representing 
both such general concepts as DISEASE or MENTAL DISORDER, 
and the concepts of individual diseases and mental disorders. Con-
sider  for  example the concepts  of  individual  mental  disorders.  In 
DSM-5 they are  characterized  in  terms of  syndromes  and opera-
tional criteria. However, at the level of specific mental disorders, it 
is often impossible to individuate sets of symptoms and criteria that 
are  individually  necessary  and/or  jointly  sufficient  to  determine 
membership. 
3. Some Preliminaries of a Case Study: The Schizophrenia 
Spectrum
As a preliminary step to prove our hypothesis that the general con-
cept of MENTAL DISORDER and (most of) the various concepts of 
individual  mental  disorders  – as  they are  currently  described and 
categorized by DSM-5 – should be treated as non-classical ones is 
preliminary tested by developing an ontology based on the OWL-DL 
(Ontology Web Language Description Logic) dialect. Some impor-
tant remarks must be done here.
Despite the fact that there already are formal ontologies dealing with 
mental disorders (SNOMED is such an example), we decided to de-
velop a new one trying to overcome some of their potential limita-
tions. In particular, with respect to the existing taxonomies of mental 
disorders, that are typically part of larger representation systems and 
must thus meet their criteria and general principles, we are currently 
building a representation that  aims to be independent to previous 
ones and closer to the DSM-5 nosology and rationales (having also 
well clear in mind what are the main limits and problems of the Sta-
tistical Manual). We believe it is a necessary stage in order to verify 
and evaluate the exact limits of a classical approach to the formal 
representation of the concepts of individual mental disorders, as we 
suspect  that  some problems encountered by the  already available 
formal ontologies might be due to an oversimplification of the struc-
ture and rationales of DSM-5 descriptive nosology, which is syn-
drome based and criterial.
On this respect, we take seriously the DSM-5 definition of the con-
cept of MENTAL DISORDER, according to which a mental disor-
der is primarily a syndrome, that is a set of symptoms and signs. 
This means, for example, that the classes of Mental_Disorder and 
Symptom must be linked through an appropriate property (it must be 
remembered  that,  in  OWL terminology,  properties  correspond  to 
roles,  or  two  place  relations).  Making  the  relationships  between 
mental disorders and pattern of symptoms explicit might also help to 
clear  out  some classification disputes  about  where  to  place  some 
controversial mental disorders among DSM-5 chapters. 
Moreover, even if the DSM-5 definition of the concept of MENTAL 
DISORDER requires a dysfunction being in place, there is also the 
widespread  conviction  that  syndromes  should  not  be  reified.  The 
possibility to discover that basic dimensions of functioning, and thus 
dysfunctioning,  cut  across  traditional  syndrome-based  diagnostic 
categories is actually envisaged – as the NIMH Research Domain 
Criteria (RDoC) project seems to corroborate. This means, for ex-
ample, that the class of Mental_Disorder must be conceived in non 
realist terms and the concept of MENTAL DISORDER clearly dis-
tinguished from the concept of DISEASE.
Broadly speaking, the rationale we have followed to build our DSM-
5 compliant ontology can be summarized in 4 steps, as shown in 
Figure 1 below: 
1. Identification of main concepts;
2. Formalization of classes and properties;
3. Implementation;
4. Comparison between symptoms and evaluation (i.e. modeling decision about 
the taxonomical position and the related axioms that need to be added).
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Fig. 1. The process of building a DSM-5 compliant ontology. 
The goal of the first phase was identifying, organizing and structur-
ing all the main concepts of the domain by using an abstract model, 
e.g.  graphs  or  schemes.  Initially,  we  focused  on  the  chapter  of 
Schizophrenia  Spectrum  only,  and  defined  relevant  concepts  and 
properties through a glossary or dictionary written in natural  lan-
guage. Afterwards, with the second phase we used description logics 
to formalize all the concepts and properties previously identified and 
thus to obtain the adequate terminological domain knowledge. The 
third phase aimed at encoding and implementing a formal ontology 
using Protégé, a widespread ontology editor developed at the Stan-
ford University (http://protege.stanford.edu/). In the fourth and last 
phase we compared various symptoms among ontologies and differ-
ent disorders. Moreover, the process of evaluation can be also driven 
in parallel with the previous three steps.
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Fig. 2. Top Level of the Schizophrenia Spectrum Ontology.
The Schizophrenia_Spectrum ontology that  we have developed is 
currently composed by 58 classes, 5 properties and 191 axioms. As 
already mentioned, the ontology has been developed by adopting the 
OWL-DL (Ontology Web Language-Description Logic) dialect. 
The three main classes are Mental_Disorder, Patient and Symptom. 
The top level of the ontology, which focuses on the various classes 
of the Schizophrenia Spectrum category and the associated symp-
toms, is shown in Figure 2 above. 
The top-level classes chosen by the adopted modeling not only allow 
that each mental disorder might be identified through quite different 
set of symptoms (as it is clearly demanded by the DSM-5 diagnostic 
criteria), but also address comorbidity (a phenomenon which is still 
common in DSM-5 meaning that each patient showing a certain set 
of symptoms might be diagnosed with more than one mental disor-
der).
The  class  of  Patient  allows  to  model  many  different  patient  in-
stances, which is useful in order to include personal information re-
garding individuals (such as age, sex, gender, ethnicity, etcetera).
Finally,  the  class  Symptom currently  contains  the  following main 
subclasses,  which have been built  in accordance with the DSM-5 
criteria:  Delusions,  Disorganized  Thinking,  Grossly  Disorganized 
Abnormal Motor Behavior, Hallucinations, Negative Symptoms.
The class  of  Symptom and  its  subclasses  are  disjointed  from the 
Schizophrenia Spectrum other Psychotic Disorder and its subclasses 
as this guarantees the separation from symptoms that involves other 
mental disease.
The current version of the ontology (which is still subject to revi-
sions and extensions) is available in a navigable format at: http://
www.di.unito.it/~lieto/Schizophrenia_Spectrum.html.  Even  if  we 
developed a formal ontology which is more DSM-5 compliant than 
others (for instance, Ceusters and Smith 2010), as we predicted it is 
still unable to handle the representation and reasoning of common-
sense cues. 
4. A proposal: A Hybrid Architecture
In this perspective – given the fact that the concepts of MENTAL 
DISORDER and individual mental disorders clearly exhibit typicali-
ty effects that cannot be handled with traditional, purely composi-
tional, representational systems – we propose to integrate typicality 
effects in computational representations of concepts. More precisely, 
we focus on prototypical and exemplar based approaches, and pro-
pose to combine them in a hybrid model. (For the time being, we do 
not  take  into  consideration  here  theory-theory  approaches,  since 
them are in some sense more vaguely defined if compared to the 
other two positions.)
Following  the  approach  proposed  in  Frixione  and  Lieto  (2013, 
2014b) and preliminary tested in Lieto et al. (2017), we propose a 
hybrid  architecture  (see  Figure  3  below)  combining  a  “classical” 
component (in which concepts are represented, as far as it is possi-
ble, in terms of necessary and/or sufficient conditions) with a “typi-
cality-oriented” component, allowing both prototype and exemplar-
based representations. 
 
Fig. 3. The conceptual architecture we propose. 
The “classical” component is demanded to some standard ontologi-
cal formalism, such as DLs; the “typicality-oriented” component to a 
conceptual space, where conceptual spaces are a geometric frame-
work for knowledge representation proposed by Peter Gärdenfors 
(2014).
In a conceptual space concepts are described in terms of a number of 
quality dimensions. In some cases, such dimensions are directly re-
lated to perception; examples could be temperature, weight, bright-
ness, pitch. In other cases, dimensions can be more abstract in na-
ture. To each quality dimension is associated a geometrical (topolog-
ical or metrical) structure. 
The central idea behind this approach is that the representation of 
knowledge can take advantage from the geometrical structure of the 
spaces. Instances (or exemplars) are represented as points in a space, 
and their degree of similarity can be calculated in a natural way ac-
cording to some suitable distance measure. Concepts correspond to 
regions,  and  regions  with  different  geometrical  properties  corre-
spond to different kinds of concepts. Prototypes and typicality ef-
fects  have a  natural  geometrical  interpretation:  a  prototype corre-
sponds to the geometrical centre of the region representing a concept 
(provided that the concept corresponds to a convex region). Thus, 
given a concept,  a  degree of  centrality can be associated to each 
point that falls within the corresponding region. This degree of cen-
trality can be interpreted as a measure of its typicality. Conversely, 
given a set  of  n  prototypes represented as points  in a conceptual 
space, a tessellation of the space in n convex regions can be deter-
mined in the terms of the so-called Voronoi diagrams. An example is 
shown in Figure 4, where the center of each region corresponds to 
the prototype of a given concept, and where different exemplars can 
be represented as points in a conceptual region. The similarity be-
tween exemplars, or between prototypes and exemplars is obtained 
by calculating the metric distances in the underlying space. 
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Fig. 4.  An example of the Voronoi tessellation of a conceptual spaces (from Gardenfors and 
Williams 2001).
In sum, the appeal of conceptual spaces consists in the fact that they 
provides a natural  way of representing typicality effects,  and that 
their geometrical structure provides a natural way of calculating the 
semantic relations between concepts,  prototypes and exemplars in 
terms of metrical  distance.  In general,  conceptual  spaces seem to 
provide a better framework for modeling typicality effects in artifi-
cial system if compared to both standard symbolic systems and con-
nectionist architectures – on this aspect see Lieto, Chella and Frix-
ione (2017). 
Considering the concepts of MENTAL DISORDER and individual 
mental disorders an hybrid architecture as the one described above 
would  result  particularly  useful.  On the  one  hand,  the  “classical” 
component – demanded to the ontology we developed and described 
in the above section – would allow us to make important inferences 
and comparisons between individual mental disorders. Moreover, it 
would be needed to clearly represent some individual mental disor-
ders that seem to be characterized by necessary (and sufficient) con-
ditions (their medical or substance aetiology or some specific symp-
toms). For example, Bulimia nervosa seems to be characterized by 
necessary and sufficient conditions, as shown by its diagnostic crite-
ria below: 
A. Recurrent episodes of binge eating. An episode of binge eating is characterized by both 
of the following: 
1. Eating, in a discrete period of time (e.g., within any 2-hour period), an amount of 
food that is definitely larger than what most individuals would eat in a similar period of 
time under similar circumstances. 
2. A sense of lack of control over eating during the episode (e.g., a feeling that one 
cannot stop eating or control what or how much one is eating). 
B. Recurrent inappropriate compensatory behaviors in order to prevent weight gain, such 
as self-induced vomiting; misuse of laxatives, diuretics, or other medications; fasting; or 
excessive exercise. 
C. The binge eating and inappropriate compensatory behaviors both occur, on average, at 
least once a week for 3 months. 
D. Self-evaluation is unduly influenced by body shape and weight.
E. The disturbance does not occur exclusively during episodes of anorexia nervosa. 
(American Psychiatric Association 2013, p. 345).
Alternatively, Major neurocognitive disorders are characterized by 
similar syndromes and differentiated by their underline pathological 
cause (e.g., Alzheimer’s disease, Frontotemporal lobar degeneration, 
Lewy body disease, Vascular disease, Traumatic brain injury, HIV 
infection, Prion disease, Parkinson’s disease, Huntington’s disease), 
which is thus a necessary condition for their diagnosis.
Also the general concept of MENTAL DISORDER, at least its theo-
retical  and “conceptually clean” version – as the one stated in the 
Introduction of DSM-5 – may allow for necessary (and sufficient) 
criteria, such as the dysfunction requirement: 
A mental disorder is a syndrome characterized by clinically significant disturbance in an 
individual’s cognition, emotion regulation, or behavior that reflects a dysfunction in the 
psychological, biological, or developmental processes underlying mental functioning. 
Mental disorders are usually associated with significant distress or disability in social, 
occupational, or other important activities (American Psychiatric Association 2013, p. 
20). 
On  the  other  hand,  the  “typicality-oriented” component  would  be 
necessary to deal with typicality effects and handle all those individ-
ual mental disorders, such as those listed in the chapter “Schizophre-
nia Spectrum and Other Psychotic Disorders”, that are not character-
ized by necessary and sufficient conditions. Moreover, as far as the 
general concept of MENTAL DISORDER is concerned, the “typical-
ly-oriented” component  would  be  useful  to  represent  its  common 
sense or practical version, which is much needed to guide us in dis-
tinguishing between health and pathological conditions in most of 
ordinary situations (Amoretti, Frixione, Lieto 2017). 
On this respect, we shall try to develop a conceptual space with a 
number of quality dimensions able to identify the prototype of men-
tal disorder as well as the relevant exemplars. Some candidates for 
the qualitative dimensions might be related to the duration of symp-
toms, their clinical significance, their functional dimensions, and so 
on. Such as geometric framework would constitute the “non-classi-
cal” component of our architecture. Then, we shall also try to repre-
sent the various concepts of individual mental disorders within such 
as conceptual space and evaluate their positions, as well as their de-
gree of typicality. 
Concluding remarks
To sum up, we exposed the problems raised by conceptual “typicali-
ty” to the classical theory of concepts, focusing on the general con-
cept of MENTAL DISORDER and the various concepts of individ-
ual mental disorders as described by DSM-5. Then, we summarized 
one important issue faced by description logics in representing med-
ical knowledge: as they are associated to a model theoretic, Tarskian 
style semantics, they prove to be unable to represent concepts in pro-
totypical terms. To reinforce this conclusion, we build an ontology 
specifically  suited  to  represent  the  general  concept  of  MENTAL 
DISORDER and (most of) the various concepts of individual mental 
disorders. Despite being more DSM-5 compliant than other ontolo-
gies, our formalism was still unable to handle typicality effects. We 
thus proposes a hybrid approach combining a “classical” component 
(in which concepts are represented in terms of necessary and/or suf-
ficient conditions) with a “typicality-oriented” component, allowing 
both prototype and exemplar-based representations. 
In order to develop such a hybrid architecture, the next step would 
be defining a suitable number of quality dimensions able to identify 
the prototype of the general concept of MENTAL DISORDER and 
its relevant exemplars (such as SCHIZOPHRENIA, BORDERLINE 
PERSONALITY  DISORDER,  or  MAJOR  DEPRESSION).  One 
possible application of this integration would be the realization of an 
artificial system that, given a set of typical traits characterizing the 
different symptoms, would be able to provide the identification of 
the corresponding mental disorder.
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